STRINGER -v- COPLEY

This case determined that invoices of medical agencies should distinguish between the medical fee and their own charges, the latter being sufficiently particularised to enable the cost officer to be satisfied they did not exceed the reasonable and proportionate cost of the solicitors doing the work. The cited case is an appeal by the claimant against a detailed assessment of her costs in relation to an action arising out of a road traffic accident. There was no principle which precluded the fees of a medical agency being recoverable between the parties, provided it was demonstrated that their charges did not exceed the reasonable and proportionate costs of the work if it had been done by the solicitors. Both parties accepted that this item should be restored in full, although the judge found that the invoices of medical agencies should distinguish between the medical fee and their own charges, the latter being sufficiently itemized to enable the cost officer to be satisfied they did not exceed the reasonable and proportionate cost of the solicitors doing the work. The fees of medical support agencies could also be treated as though the work had been done by the solicitors and charged accordingly. We believe it is worth bearing in mind that the instruction of such agency is designed to control costs, not to increase them, and any disproportionate fee will be frowned upon by the Courts. (See also the case of Woollard -v- Fowler.)

CRANE -v- CANONS LEISURE CENTRE

This case is by now a well known case which centres on the question of whether or not Cost Draftsman’s fees are to be regarded as Profit Costs or Disbursements and thus whether or not a success fee can properly be claimed upon the same.
When considering the claim for assessment costs in this matter, the costs officer originally allowed a success fee to be applied to the Cost Draftsman’s fee on the basis that the Cost Draftsman’s fees were to be regarded as Profit Costs.
On appeal from the costs officer, Master Wright disallowed the success fee on the Cost Draftsman’s fees on the basis that the fees were to be regarded as Disbursements and not Profit Costs.
The Court considered what the definitions of “base costs” and “disbursements” were within the CCFA in this case. Base costs were defined as:
"… charges for work done by or on behalf of the Solicitors which would have been payable if this agreement did not provide for a success fee, calculated on the basis of the fees allowable for that work in the court in which the action in question is conducted or would be conducted if proceedings were to be issued."
Disbursements were defined as:
"… expenses which the Solicitors incur on the member's behalf in the course of an action, such as court fees, fees for experts, barristers' fees (including success fees for barristers where appropriate), copying charges made by others, travelling and hotel expenses (this is not an exhaustive list)."
It was noted that Master Hurst had held in Claims Direct Test Cases, Tranche 2 that a characteristic of whether charges of a person engaged by solicitors are profit costs or disbursements is whether the solicitors have a personal responsibility to the client for the work done.
By a majority of 2:1 the appeal was allowed. It was held that the work undertaken by the Cost Draftsman was solicitors work. It was work which the solicitor had been retained to do and whilst they had chosen to delegate that work to a Cost Draftsman, they had retained control and responsibility for it. Thus the Cost Draftsman’s fees were to be regarded as Profit Costs upon which a success fee could properly be claimed.
Our clients will be aware that MRN have always applied a success fee to our fees where applicable, though we do not retain this for our benefit. Any element of success fee recovered on our fees has always been passed directly on to our clients for their benefit and we intend to continue doing so. This judgment simply provides us with an authority on this point which hopefully will circumvent the challenges we have previously faced to the recoverability of a success fee on our fees.